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Summary
This paper presents the  considerations of Polish economists about the  economic 
crises and the business cycle in the interwar period. According to E. Taylor, the causes 
of  the  then crisis of overproduction, accompanied by the phenomenon of price scis-
sors, included varied elasticity of demand for agricultural products and industrial prod-
ucts, as well as monetary inflation and new technical inventions. E. Lipiński believed 
that the  crisis was a  result of  overinvestment. State interventionism in  the  econo-
mies did not ease, but aggravated the crisis on a global scale. W.M. Zawadzki point-
ed to the nature of the crisis in Poland as being due to economic underdevelopment, 
low consumption, and a huge shortage of capital. J.W. Libicki took the view that an 
analysis of the crisis in agriculture should be combined with an analysis of profitabil-
ity of  agricultural production. A.  Krzyżanowski linked production fluctuations with 
changes in  investment demand, and the  latter with the  assessment of  profitability, 
which depends on  the  interest rate. A.  Heydel explained the  business cycle with an 
incorrect interest rate policy. At the  same time, he postulated that the  state should 
refrain from interference in economic life. On the other hand, M. Kalecki pointed to 
the  excessive optimism of businesses, causing an increase in  investment, which leads 
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to changes in global demand, as a  cause of fluctuations. He advocated the  inflation-
ary financing of public works by the state.
Keywords: history of economic thought; theories of economic crises; theories of the bu-
siness cycle
JEL Classification: B20; E32
introduction
The issues of  economic crises caused by overproduction became a  sub-
ject of  academic reflection of  economists after the  occurrence of  this phe-
nomenon, i.e. in  the early 19th century. Soon, these issues were also taken up 
by Polish researchers into economic problems, including August Cieszkowski, 
Leon Winiarski, Julian Marchlewski, Róża Luksemburg, and Jerzy Heryng. 
This means that the  studies of  Polish economists in  this area already have 
more than a  150-year history. Concern for the  world economic situation 
in  the  first decades of  the  20th century was also reflected in  Polish econom-
ic thought. A large group of Polish academics also responded to the outbreak 
of  the  Great Depression of  1929–1933. This study is  devoted to the  pre-
sentation of  their views. It includes a  selection of  reflections on  the  causes 
and course of  the  economic crisis, the  agrarian crisis, and the  economic cy-
cle. However, given the  scope of  this article, not all publications on  these 
topics have been taken into account; the  considerations of  Roman Rybarski, 
Jan Piwowarczyk, Ferdinand Zweig, Feliks Młynarski, and Oskar Lange have 
been omitted. The method of historical analysis has been applied.
1. economic crises
The causes and course of the economic crisis called the Great Depression 
were dealt with particularly by E. Taylor, E. Lipiński, and W.M. Zawadzki.
In his article Istota kryzysu światowego (The Essence of  the  Global Crisis, 
1931), Edward Taylor, representing the neoclassical school, drew attention to 
the  need for the  reconstruction of  what is  known as J.B. Say’s law of  mar-
kets which is  about the  impossibility of  general overproduction. According 
to E.  Taylor, in  order to explain the  current crisis the  concept of  elasticity 
of demand had to be applied. It shows that various types of goods are char-
acterized by a different elasticity of demand. Empirical studies indicated that 
the  demand for agricultural products is  more rigid than the  demand for in-
dustrial products. A period of steady production growth must be followed by 
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a lack of sales and falling prices in the whole economy. And since agricultur-
al production has lower elasticity of  demand, overproduction initially occurs 
in  agriculture. The decline in  the purchasing power of  the  agricultural sector 
results in a decline in the demand for industrial products, generating the phe-
nomenon of  general overproduction. The  level of  prices of  industrial prod-
ucts remains at a  higher level than the  level of  prices of  agricultural prod-
ucts. This phenomenon is  called the  opening of  price scissors, which is  part 
of the economic crisis involving general overproduction. The emergence of rel-
ative overproduction in agriculture was the result of taking up the cultivation 
of  new areas in  new countries and intensifying production in  Europe and 
North America. Financed through budget inflation, the  increase in  general 
overproduction worldwide, which was faster than the population growth, was 
accompanied by an increase in  consumption and investment, which further 
stimulated the  development of  production. Among the  reasons for the  col-
lapse of the current economic situation, E. Taylor also counted the disparities 
between the circulation of money and the amount of capital caused by mon-
etary inflation, and the  disruption of  the  increased inflationary process that 
had begun during the First World War. An important cause of the crisis was 
also the  fast pace of  epoch-making inventions and technological advances 
that revolutionized industry, and accelerated the  industrialization of Western 
countries, as well as increasing world production. Due to the depth of the cri-
sis analysed and the  need for a  thorough reconstruction of  economic life, 
E.  Taylor foresaw the  development of  a new system of  global economic re-
lations, which would be a  long process. One of  the  features of  this transfor-
mation would be the  entering on  the  industrial path of  new countries, rich 
in natural resources and cheaper labour, which — ensuring higher profitabil-
ity — would attract the  missing capital and industrial culture. According to 
E.  Taylor, the  geographical displacement of  economic life centres would al-
so occur1.
Edward Lipiński, who was a supporter of neoclassical economics, present-
ed his explanation of  the  crisis phenomena which may be caused by overin-
vestment in a paper entitled Uwagi o kryzysie (Some Remarks About the Crisis, 
1931). He explained, however, that certain conditions must occur for excess 
investments to lead to the  outbreak of  a crisis. Overinvestment occurs when 
the production of manufacturing equipment, i.e. capital goods or other invest-
ment goods, exceeds the  real demand for these goods. The  demand of  some 
branches for these devices depends mainly on  their prices. Organizing their 




production, manufacturing facilities select the factors of production in a team 
(comprehensive) manner. Their optimality is guaranteed by the law of harmo-
ny. All devices must be selected in correct proportions. Producing even a single 
machine or device in excess means overinvestment. Each pointless investment 
constitutes a socio-economic loss. What is more, the means of production that 
could be used to produce consumer goods are consumed in order to aimless-
ly produce these unnecessary devices. In a capitalist economy, these ill-judged 
investments inevitably cause a  crisis whose manifestation is  the  lack of  sales 
of goods at the prices calculated earlier. Products manufactured in excess will 
also be sold, but a  little later, and at a  lower price. This adjustment of  sup-
ply and demand requires a  transitional period, which is  a crisis. Lower pric-
es of  investment goods reduce the purchasing power of  their producers, who 
limit their demand for the factors of production consumed by them. The im-
balance appearing in  one market moves into other markets, and so the  cri-
sis spills over a  number of  interrelated markets. Economic recovery, i.e. an 
increased investment flow, is caused by (cyclical) changes in the economic sit-
uation, and these are the  result of  the  dynamic nature of  a social economy. 
However, there would be no dynamics, growth, development, or economic re-
covery, if no changes in the credit offer occurred. Credit expansion stimulates 
the will to expand investment. According to E. Lipiński, these are two factors 
that cause cyclical changes in  the  economy, as well as two factors taken into 
account by economic theory. The  recovery from the  years 1927–1928, which 
preceded the  outbreak of  the  crisis in  Poland, had its source in  both private 
(but mostly by foreign companies) and state excess capitalization. The exces-
sive increase in investment in our country was also caused by Bank Polski (the 
Polish Bank), which charged on their loans an interest rate 3 times lower than 
the  one prevailing on  the  private market. A  factor responsible for the  out-
break of the crisis was also government interventionism (although recognized 
as a  necessity of  the  development of  modern capitalism) blocking, accord-
ing to E.  Lipiński, the  activity of  economic automatism, which in  the  ear-
ly stages of  capitalism maintained economic equilibrium. Through the  intro-
duction of minimum prices and protective tariffs, states exacerbated the crisis 
on  a world scale. Any interference in  the  economy, be it  by the  state, or  by 
a  cartel, leads to a  temporary or  permanent imbalance2. E.  Lipiński wrote: 
“The whole mechanism that regulates balance is  thus broken. One could put 
forward a proposition that the current economic crisis is a result of the gradu-
al shift from market capitalism, that is a capitalism in which market phenom-
ena are a  regulator of  balance, to planned or  regulated capitalism. However, 
 2 E. Lipiński, Uwagi o kryzysie, “Ekonomista”, Vol. 1/1931, pp. 20−31.
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since planning and regulating are performed only in  one section, and not 
in  the whole business, we face a much sharper slump in balance than in pe-
riods when the market mechanism worked more efficiently, and thus the cor-
rection of  the  market was more direct and earlier. Also, the  duration of  pe-
riods of adaptation is now longer since individual components of  the market 
structure have lost flexibility. Hence, the  need for a  long period of  adapta-
tion of  the  remaining components to the  changed constellations of  market 
quantities”3.
On the other hand, standing on the grounds of the mathematical school, 
Władysław Marian Zawadzki took the  view that while the  Polish econom-
ic crisis consisted of  phases similar to those observed in  other countries, 
there were, however, significant differences in  the  phenomena accompany-
ing it. To a  large extent, they resulted from the  economic underdevelopment 
of our country. In addition, the economic crisis in Poland occurred at the end 
of 1928 due to the drop in agricultural commodity prices on the world mar-
ket, which slowed down the pace of the economy in the following year. Most 
of  the  symptoms of  depression occurred at the  end of  1929, and deepened 
the  next year. They corresponded to the  phenomena accompanying the  re-
cession phase of  the  classic business cycle, such as a  decline in  industrial 
production, bankruptcy of  enterprises, rising unemployment, falling stock 
prices, etc. In 1930, a  normal course of  the  cycle and the  imminent arriv-
al of  the  recovery phase was anticipated. In the  following months, howev-
er, a deepening of the depression followed. Banks applied an extremely strin-
gent credit policy, reducing almost completely access to credit. This in  turn 
hampered the  sales of  products, and caused a  drop in  income, which inten-
sified the  negative effects of  the  crisis. Production fell by approx. 50%, and 
the unemployment rate reached 32%. The breakthrough came only after four 
years, i.e.  in  1933 which saw a  slight improvement in  economic indicators. 
According to W.M. Zawadzki, the  explanation of  the  specifics of  the  Polish 
crisis using credit money creation theory was very difficult since the  Polish 
banking system was underdeveloped and, therefore, deposit banks did not 
generate credit money. Hence, Polish banks caused neither depression, nor re-
covery. A  similar role was played by foreign loans. Furthermore, deflationary 
measures cannot be considered as a  cause of  the  crisis; deflation was rather 
a  consequence of  the crisis4. W.M. Zawadzki asserted, “Thus, it  seems unde-
 3 Ibidem, pp. 31−32.
 4 W.  Zawadzki, Przesilenie gospodarcze w świetle doświadczeń polskich, [in:] Pamiętnik trzy-




niable that the phenomena of money circulation and credit are not sufficient 
to explain either the reasons for, or, all the more, the exceptionally long dura-
tion and severity of, the crisis”5. John Maynard Keynes’s theory of undercon-
sumption also proved to be of  little use. The  Polish economy was character-
ized by low consumption, much lower than in  Western European countries, 
and a high ratio of consumption to income, which led to the possibility of in-
creasing production. There was also the  possibility of  implementing a  large 
number of  investment projects, but our country suffered a  huge shortage 
of  capital. However, in  J.M. Keynes’s theory, capital employed must reach 
high marginal performance, causing economic recovery. According to the au-
thor of  Przesilenie gospodarcze w świetle doświadczeń polskich (The Economic 
Crisis in the Light of Polish Experience), the case of our country showed clear-
ly that there were some specific factors that caused and prolonged the  eco-
nomic crisis. These were the previously mentioned phenomena such as insuf-
ficient capital resources and inadequate proportions between solid and liquid 
capital. The  Vilnius academic included money and real savings, comprising 
easily exchangeable goods, in  liquid capital. Unfortunately, at that time, liq-
uid capital in  the  aforementioned sense did not exist in  the Polish economy. 
In the  pre-crisis period, Polish society increased consumption, but it  failed 
to make sufficient savings, hence, their absence prevented merchants and in-
dustrialists from keeping larger supplies of finished goods and raw materials. 
Fluctuations in production and sales froze the existing capital. Thus, the  lack 
of working capital experienced by entrepreneurs reduced both production and 
sales, closing the vicious circle of depression. Contrary to J.M. Keynes’s asser-
tions, it was the  lack of  savings that caused and exacerbated the Polish eco-
nomic crisis6.
On the other hand, in his article under the  title Zagadnienie państw rol-
nych Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej (The Issue of Agricultural Countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, 1932), W.M. Zawadzki stressed that the  great depres-
sion differed significantly from the  economic crises occurring earlier. A  fea-
ture of  the  great downturn was its universality and a  very deep depression, 
regardless of  the  strength and nature of  the  economy. He also claimed that 
international economic cooperation could have been an effective way to fight 
the  Great Depression. It would concern especially agricultural countries, for 
 5 Ibidem, p. 208.
 6 Ibidem, pp. 208−211.
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which a  necessary condition for economic recovery was to open both exter-
nal and domestic markets7.
2. the agrarian crisis
An interesting discussion of  the  agrarian crisis from a  theoretical point 
of  view was undertaken by a  representative of  the  neoclassical school, 
Wojciech Janusz Libicki, in  his article under the  title Klęska urodzaju (The 
Curse of  Abundance, 1931). In his opinion, the  relationship between a  good 
(or bad) harvest and yields of  agricultural production, especially plant pro-
duction, should be taken into account in explaining the problem of overpro-
duction in  agriculture. At the  same time, the  author of  the  article assumed 
that there is free competition and one price on the market. Undertaking busi-
ness activity, a  rational entrepreneur is driven only by profit. In order to cal-
culate profitability, it is necessary to know the unit price and unit cost of pro-
duction. But agricultural producers, as opposed to an industrial manufacturer, 
do not know either future prices, or  unit costs. It follows that they can cal-
culate total costs, but they are unable to predict the  size of  future produc-
tion8. J.W. Libicki wrote: “The total costs incurred during the production pe-
riod are constant, regardless of its outcome. Thus, the unit cost varies inversely 
to crops results. The  better the  yield, the  lower the  unit cost, and the  other 
way round”9. As  production increases, the  cost per unit decreases, while to-
tal costs, which also include the  land rent, grow. In turn, the  demand curve 
(which is  also the  price curve) takes the  shape of  a descending curve with 
different degrees of  flexibility. The  intersection point of  the  unit costs curve 
and the  price (demand) curve designates the  point of  equilibrium, which 
sets the  free market price and the  volume of  production ensuring profitabil-
ity. Above this quantity, agricultural entrepreneurs suffer losses, while below 
it they make an extraordinary profit. Changes in prices can, however, be com-
pensated by shifts in the demand curve. Good or bad crops shift the demand 
curve and the  equilibrium point. For an individual agricultural farm, howev-
er, price is  a fixed quantity. Good crops, i.e. achieving a  good result, provide 
a  farm with an extra profit, while crop failure (a weaker performance) re-
 7 W.  Zawadzki, Zagadnienie państw rolnych Europy Środkowej i  Wschodniej, “Polska 
Gospodarcza”, Vol. 35/1932, p. 1010.
 8 J. Libicki, Klęska urodzaju, “Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny”, Vol. 2/1931, 
pp. 206−207. 
 9 Ibidem, p. 207.
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sults in  a loss. An extremely positive phenomenon for an individual agricul-
tural farm is  a good harvest and a  shift, due to the  smaller crops in  the  rest 
of  the  world, of  the  horizontal straight line of  prices upwards, while a  neg-
ative phenomenon is  a bad harvest, accompanied by a  fall in prices resulting 
from a good harvest in the rest of the world. Based on the analysis performed, 
the  author of  The  Curse of  Abundance formulated the  conclusion that good 
harvest and crop failures in  agriculture produce opposite effects for the  na-
tional economy and individual farms. The views on  the  curse or  the blessing 
of  abundance should rather be regarded as meaningless platitudes. It is  rea-
sonable to consider these phenomena in  a broader context, a  wider complex 
of phenomena10.
3. the business cycle
The issue of cyclical fluctuations in production raised considerable inter-
est among Polish economists. Publications by A.  Krzyżanowski, A.  Heydel, 
and M. Kalecki are especially noteworthy. 
Representing the  neoclassical school, Adam Krzyżanowski presented his 
theory of the business cycle in several studies, among others in Polska konjunk-
tura gospodarcza w świetle teorji przesileń i  przewidywań (The Polish Economic 
Situation in  the Light of  the Theory of Crises and Projections, 1929), and Teorja 
i  polityka oszczędności (The Theory and Politics of  Saving, 1931). Similarly to 
Gustav Cassel’s theory, it  is a theory of overinvestment. A. Krzyżanowski as-
sumed that monetary and credit factors have a significant impact on the course 
of the business cycle. Mood swings and viability assessments result in chang-
es in  production volumes. The  profit rate and interest rate affect changes 
in  the  demand for means of  production (investment) and savings, and these 
lead to fluctuations in production. Profitability fluctuations, leading to cyclical 
fluctuations, disrupt the balance, but these phenomena stimulate the mecha-
nisms that lead the economy towards equilibrium. This regularity occurs in any 
dynamic economy. In contrast, economic growth is a result of automatic, un-
fettered activities of  economic entities, which should not be hindered by any 
form of state interference. The pace of economic growth depends on the rate 
of  accumulation, and this depends on  the  rate of profit and competitiveness. 
The main brake on growth is  insufficient savings11. 
 10 Ibidem, pp. 208−218.
 11 A. Krzyżanowski, Polska konjunktura gospodarcza w świetle teorji przesileń i  prze-widywań, 
Nakładem Krakowskiej Spółki Wydawniczej, Kraków 1929, p. 13 and next.; A. Krzyżanowski, 
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In turn, in  his considerations of  the  economic situation, Adam Heydel, 
a  supporter of  the  psychological school, observed that from a  theoreti-
cal point of  view endogenous economic theories are of  more value than ex-
ogenous ones. The  author of  the  article under the  title Teorja konjunktury 
(The Theory of  the Economic Situation, 1929) pointed out that the main reason 
for cyclical fluctuations in  production is  the  inappropriate interest rate pol-
icy of  banks, through excessive currency issuance. A  low interest rate causes 
investment boom, disproportions between fixed and working capital occur, 
and inflation accelerates. Thus, inflation results in disparities in economic life. 
Keeping the  bank interest rate at the  market rate level is  the  most effec-
tive way to stabilize the  economic situation. In his opinion, however, due to 
the short history, greater educational value should be granted to empirical re-
search rather than theoretical speculation in explaining the crises and fluctu-
ations of  the economic situation12. 
A. Heydel devoted his article under the title Kryzys, interwencja i etatyzm 
(The crisis, intervention, and statism, 1931) to the crisis understood not as a col-
lapse of  prosperity, but as the  depression experienced by the  world economy 
since 1929. Among various crises he distinguishes those of scarcity and of ex-
cess. Crises of scarcity are caused by catastrophic crop failures, revolutions, and 
wars, and therefore non-economic factors that economics cannot explain, and 
which it  cannot heal. Economics is  interested in  crises of  excess caused by 
economic factors that lead to an apparent abundance of goods. Crises of  ex-
cess include cyclical and structural crises, however, the  differences between 
them are difficult to explain. Cyclical crises are repeated with a 6-to-10-year 
regularity, whereas structural crises are caused by changes in management con-
ditions. Economists have identified a range of extra-cyclical causes that trigger 
off crises. Gustav Cassel pointed to the  lack of  gold and inappropriate dis-
tribution of  this material between countries. According to another hypothe-
sis, advocated by Roman Dmowski and Edward Taylor, the crisis of 1929 was 
triggered off by industrial hyperproduction, generated by competition from 
Asian countries, which employed cheap workforces. Since this crisis occurred 
nine years after the  depression of  1920, A.  Heydel held that cyclical factors 
were responsible for the 1929 crisis. Just as in his earlier work entitled Teorja 
konjunktury (The Theory of  the  Economic Situation), he stated that only mon-
etary theory adequately explains the  fluctuation of  economic life. According 
Teorja i polityka oszczędności, Nakładem Rady Zjazdów Instytucyj Oszczędnościowych w Polsce, 
Warszawa 1931, p. 11 and next.




to this theory, whose supporter was also the author of Crisis, Intervention and 
Statism, the low interest rate policy pursued by emission and depository banks 
is  responsible for recovery and depression. In addition, A.  Heydel believed 
that the  level of  interest rates should be shaped spontaneously by the  ratio 
of demand for capital and the supply of capital, at a level balancing the capi-
tal market. However, it is arbitrarily fixed by people directing financial institu-
tions, in isolation from the whole of economic life. If the level of interest rates 
is determined freely by any institution as an intervention in the economy, then 
it  ceases to function as a  regulator of  economic life, and even causes its dis-
turbance. With too low an interest rate, saving money becomes unprofitable, 
as opposed to investments which generally increase, causing excessive recovery. 
This recovery period does not last too long, and after its collapse it is followed 
by a period of depression. A. Heydel emphasized his belief that interventions 
in  the  financial markets are the  cause of  economic crises and fluctuations. 
The  most plausible theory explaining these phenomena is  monetary theory. 
During the crisis, the economy returns to an equilibrium. This process is usu-
ally accompanied by frictions. Interventionism and statism not only prolong 
the transitional period, i.e. the period of rebalancing, but also move the econ-
omy away from equilibrium. Thus, stiffening economic mechanisms, interven-
tionism and statism lead to the  intensification of  the crisis and the strength-
ening of frictions13. A. Heydel wrote: “It is not capitalism or liberalism, which 
it  is difficult to reproach for not existing, that fail; it  is intervention and stat-
ism that do so”14. The limitation of liberalism leads to the deepening and pro-
longing of  a crisis. “In the  hands of  managers of  economic policy there is  a 
reliable measure, which must accelerate the recovery of economic life, and it is 
the loosening of the bonds restricting economic life. Quite a lot has to be do-
ne about it  in  Poland. A  drop in  customs duties, which would force cartels 
to cut their stiffened prices, a change in the policy of the Ministry of Labour 
(...), a  prominent drop in  state and local government budgets, rather reduc-
ing the  number of  officials and state employees than lowering their salaries, 
a  fundamental change in  our interest rate policy — these are the  measures 
that will certainly accelerate the return of the Polish economy to equilibrium. 
Life itself will slowly restore it”15.
An original theory of  the  business cycle, expressed in  the  language 
of  mathematics, was announced in  1933 by Michał Kalecki, standing 
on the ground of Marxist economics, in his treatise under the title Próba teorii 
 13 A. Heydel, Kryzys, interwencja i etatyzm, “Ekonomista”, Vol. 1/1931, pp. 3−17.
 14 Ibidem, p. 17.
 15 Ibidem, p. 18.
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koniunktury (An Attempt at Economic Situation Theory). In his view, the source 
of  economic fluctuations in  the  capitalist economy is  the  investment pro-
cesses and excessive optimism of  companies, which lead to an excessive in-
crease in  the quantity of means of  production. The extension of  the produc-
tion apparatus is  greater than actual consumption. The  difficulties in  selling 
reduce the  utilization of  production factors, profitability drops, which results 
in  reduced investment and employment followed by the outbreak of  a crisis. 
Therefore, investments are a  source of  the  crisis and unemployment in  cap-
italism. The  way out of  the  crisis is  not cutting real wages, causing a  drop 
in  demand, but the  inflationary financing of  public works. Rejecting Say’s 
Law, which speaks about the  creation by supply of  its own demand, Kalecki 
concluded that the  capitalist economy does not achieve balance automatical-
ly. It follows that in Kalecki’s theory production and income depend on glob-
al demand, especially on  the  investment expenditures incurred by business-
es16. Although Kalecki developed business cycle and employment theories, 
in  which production is  determined by global demand, earlier and more ac-
curately than John Maynard Keynes, priority is  obviously wrongly attribut-
ed to the  British economist, not to the  Polish one. The  reason was making 
the  treatise available to Western economists rather late. Its simplified and 
shortened version Istota poprawy koniunkturalnej (The Essence of  the  Economic 
Upswing, 1935), originally published in  “Polska Gospodarcza”, was published 
in  the  “Econometrica” magazine only in  1935 as A  Macrodynamic Theory 
of Business Cycles. In contrast, the full text of An Attempt in English appeared 
only in  1939 under the  title Essays in  the  Theory of  Economic Fluctuations. 
Kalecki continued his research in this field in subsequent years. It culminated 
in  the book under the  title Theory of Economic Dynamics: An Essay on Cyclical 
and Long-Run Changes in  Capitalist Economy (1954), in  which he presented 
a developed theory of  the business cycle17.
 16 M.  Kalecki, Próba teorii koniunktury, [in:] M.  Kalecki, Dzieła, Vol.  1: Kapitalizm. 
Koniunktura i  zatrudnienie, PAN — PWE, Warszawa 1979, pp.  95−157. The  most impor-
tant part of  this work was reissued 30 years later as An Outline of  Economic Situation Theory. 
M. Kalecki, Prace z teorii koniunktury 1933−1939, PWN, Warszawa 1962, pp. 9−26.
 17 M.  Kalecki, Teoria dynamiki gospodarczej. Rozprawa o cyklicznych i  długofalowych zmianach 




The above views of  selected Polish economists about economic crises 
and the  business cycle, propagated in  the  interwar period allow the  draw-
ing of some conclusions. Shortly after the outbreak of  the Great Depression, 
Polish academics attempted to explain its causes, and formulated a  number 
of recommendations for economic policy. Between their views we can observe 
considerable differences, resulting mainly from the different economic schools 
represented, and the scope of research. As sources of the crisis they recognized, 
among others, diversified elasticity of  demand for agricultural and industrial 
products, monetary inflation, new technical inventions, excessive investment, as 
well as economic underdevelopment, and a shortage of capital. In their expla-
nation of the business cycle, they pointed to changes in the quantity of invest-
ment demand, interest rate policy, and the optimism of companies. The limit-
ing of state interference in economic life dominated among the postulates for 
stabilization policy, whereas the  proposal to conduct public works belonged 
to exceptions. E. Taylor’s, E. Lipiński’s, W.M. Zawadzki’s, A. Krzyżanowski’s, 
A. Heydel’s, and M. Kalecki’s considerations about crises and business cycles 
covered the  whole economy, while the  works of  J.W. Libicki aimed at one 
of its sectors. The former group of considerations is therefore more useful for 
analyses of a macroeconomic nature, while the latter for mesoeconomic anal-
yses. It is regrettable that after the outbreak of the crisis in 2008 many Polish 
economists invoked only the  views voiced by representatives of  the  Austrian 
school, Keynesianism, monetarism, and new classical economics, but omit-
ted the diverse and original Polish economic thought of  the  interwar period, 
which was the equal of  the Western thought.
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